

THE N. C. DAILY NEWS says:—We are glad to know that the Viceroy Li has given a marked proof of his interest in the Myer's medical school, and has so far carried out the promise he made when that gentleman was in Tientsin last year by inserting in the Tientsin Hong Tat, an official bill to the effect that the name of 'Dr. W. Wykeham Myer (particular services)'.

THE FUCHOW ECHO says:—The native bankers generally extend their New Year holidays until the 2nd day of the 2nd moon, but this year we observe they all commenced business again immediately after the 15th of the 1st moon, and it is believed the heavy losses they sustained last year, is the cause of this change. We hear the remaining stock of tea has been financed by bank and therefore the outlook is not a happy one.

THE FUCHOW ECHO says:—We understand that an unusual number of Cantonese laborers are at present at this port, and not only toiling many of their own countrymen, but also indulging in such other mischief. We hope the authorities concerned will see to it that they are kept away from the port before some serious case takes place, as we learn lately, a row occurred between them and Foochow men which would have resulted in several deaths if the Foochow men had not intervened.

THE STRAITS TIMES says:—We hear that it is generally understood among the Chinese in Singapore that the mission of Sir Andrew Clarke to Siam is not a Government one, but is on behalf of a syndicate of English capitalists and contractors who are desirous of constructing railways in Siam. No concession has been granted as yet, but it is believed that arrangements are being made for a survey of the several lines proposed, by the engineers who accompany the expedition. The expense of this survey will be borne by the Siam Government, and when it is finished, and the probable cost of the projected lines ascertained, the Government will then decide whether to go on with them, either wholly or partially, or not. Sir Andrew Clarke will return to Europe via Singapore as soon as the arrangements for making the survey are completed.

The Duke of Sutherland is, it is understood, merely paying a visit to the King on the invitation of His Majesty, who was grateful to his Grace for the kindness and hospitality he allowed to the Siamese Princes when in England. It is possible, however, that His Grace, who is famous for his business enterprises, may have it in view to make some investments in Siamese mining or other property.

THE WEATHER FOR FEBRUARY.

The month commenced with a rising barometer, a cold north wind, and cloudy and wet weather. On the 3rd the weather cleared, and the unusual phenomenon of snow was observed on the crest of Tai-mo-shan, and some of the higher hills in the mountain side; the air became very cold and dry, and the weather fine, the barometer having risen to 30.46, the highest of the month, at 10 a.m. on the 3rd. The following morning a slight frost occurred, and ice was found on the Peak levels. The sky became overcast again on the 5th, and the weather remained cloudy and cold until the 10th, when it became milder. Warm, cloudy and damp weather lasted for the 4 following days, with much fog on the islands between the 12th and 14th. From the 14th to the 25th cold and overcast weather prevailed with drizzling rain. During the early morning of the 20th the first thunderstorm of the year passed by from N.E. to S.W., another unusual phenomenon in Hongkong for February. The mercury in the barometer had oscillated for a week previously, and cross currents of wind from E. and S.W. were prevalent. Disturbance, with lightning, was also observed during the evening and night of the 20th. The sky began to clear on the 24th, and the 26th and 27th were very fine days—although the morning of the 27th was very foggy. The last day of the month became overcast again, and the month ended mild and wet. The greatest atmospheric pressure happened on the 3rd, when the barometer (corrected) recorded 30.46 inches. The lowest reading of the barometer, 29.94 inches, was on the 11th at 4 p.m. The mean pressure for the month was 30.14 inches, being 0.04 inches above the average of the preceding 10 years 1869 to 1887. The maximum temperature of the month, 70° Fahr., was recorded on the 29th, and the minimum, 42° Fahr., (Queen's Road level) on the 3rd and 4th the period of greatest atmospheric pressure. The mean temperature for the month was 56° Fahr., or 4° below the average of the preceding 10 years. Rain fell on as many as 15 days. The total fall for the month was 4.07 inches; above the average of the preceding 10 years by 2.55 inches. The general direction of the wind for the whole month was E. Fresh breezes blew from E.N.E. on the 5th, from E. on the 6th and 14th, from E.N.E. and E. on the 15th and from E. on the 18th. The greatest wind force did not attain to more than a fresh breeze.

THE VOLUNTEERS' HEAVY GUN COMPETITION.

Last Saturday afternoon the Hongkong Volunteers brought their annual practice with heavy guns to a conclusion. Major Tripp had kindly presented a handsome Silver Tankard to be competed for at this practice. The firing took place in the North Fort on Stonecutter's Island from one of the 9in. M.L. Guns mounted there, with plugged shell, at a moving target travelling about 5 knots an hour in low of a launch, with the usual restriction for time in lying. The range during the practice averaged between 1,800 and 2,000 yards. This gun throws a 260 lb. shell, and the charge of powder used was 30 lbs. At 2.30, in accordance with orders, the competitors mustered at Poddor's Wharf, under the charge of Major Tripp, who was assisted by Capt. MacCallum, and Lieut. Hawkins, R.A., and proceeded in the

Victoria to Stonecutter's Island. With the exception of a slight shower the weather and light during the afternoon were nearly all that could be desired, and were conducive to good shooting. Ten rounds in all were fired—seven by the actual competitors, who were chosen out of the best scores at the 64 pr. practice, and three by Major Tripp, Sergeant Diplo and MacBreen as sighting shots. The one fired by Sergeant MacBreen was the best shot of the afternoon, carrying away one of the guys of the target and part of the raft, and without express our regards to him that he was not in the competition. Sergeant Scott was the fortunate winner of the Major's handsome prize and he secured it by a very well aimed shot about 10 yards over the target. The shooting all round was creditable, nearly every shot being in good line, and although several dropped short, the Major can fairly be congratulated on the firing of his men. The last shot was by Gunner White, who was sorry to say, rather spoiled the average. Considerable delay at times was experienced by 'junks' getting in the way, and once owing to the launch taking a sharp turn the target 'turned turtle.' We were glad to see that the Volunteers stuck to their gun while it was being fired, and that the No. 1 did not leave the platform but waited to see the result of his shot. Several ladies grazed the Battery with their presence during the afternoon. We hope our 'citizen soldiers' may count on the patronage of the fair sex in future. Major Jopp of the 55th Regiment was also present, and rendered valuable assistance in taking the line of fire. We believe that it is intended to hold a competition with the 7 pr. gun on a convenient Saturday afternoon.

The following table shows the scoring of the competitors, with the distance from the target:—

Gunner Henderson	20 yards short
Sergeant Scott	15 yards over
Corporal Dado	3 yards short
Gunner Hope	30 yards over
Gunner Howard	35 yards over
Gunner Howell	10 yards short
Gunner White	120 yards short

SUPREME COURT.

IN ORIGINAL JURISDICTION.
(Before the Hon. J. Russell, Acting Chief Justice, and a Special Jury.)
Monday, March 12.

YU TEZ WAN v. J. H. GARRETT & C. L. RUTHERFORD, \$50,000 DAMAGES.
The Attorney General (H. E. L. O'Malley) and Mr. Edward Robinson, instructed by Messrs Caldwell and Wilkinson, appeared for the plaintiff; and Mr. E. J. Ackroyd, instructed by Messrs Watson and Duncan, for the defendant.

The following gentlemen were sworn as a jury: Messrs R. E. Solomon, R. M. Gray, F. W. Cross, E. H. M. Huntington, T. F. Davies, A. Veitch and A. F. Smith.

Mr Robinson read the following petition and answer:—

1. The Petitioner Yu Tez Wan is a merchant residing at Victoria in the Colony of Hongkong and until the happening of the events hereinafter narrated was trading and carrying on business at No. 34 Bonham Strand West Victoria as a Dealer in Ginseng and Drugs under the style or firm name of 'Man Yuen Tong' and as a Tea dealer under the style or firm name of Pang Yu Tai.

2. The first defendant Johannes Heinrich Garretts is and for some time past has been the managing partner in the mercantile firm of Meyer and Garretts and the second defendant Ernest Reuter is and for some time past has been the managing partner in Hongkong of the mercantile firm of Putsau & Co.

3. On or about the 24th day of March last past the business premises of the plaintiff No. 34 Bonham Strand West, which were filled with the goods and merchandise stored therein almost wholly destroyed by fire.

4. On or about the 22nd day of April now last past the Defendants falsely and maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause appeared before Ernest Woodhouse one of the Police Magistrates at this Colony charged the plaintiff with having been an accessory before the fact to the unlawful and malicious setting on fire of the said premises No. 34 Bonham Strand being a dwelling house, so the date aforesaid; and the Defendants further, improperly procured the said Magistrate upon the said charge to falsely and maliciously make, to issue his warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff and for his being brought before the said Police Magistrate to be dealt with according to law, and the Defendants under and by virtue of the said warrant caused the plaintiff to be arrested and to be imprisoned for 2 hours or thereabouts in the Police Prison kept in custody before the said Police Magistrate on the 22nd day of April now last past.

5. On the said 22nd day of April the Defendants without tendering any evidence against the plaintiff, and falsely and maliciously misrepresenting to the said Police Magistrate the gravity of the charge against the plaintiff, and the strength of the evidence which they intended to support the charge, improperly procured the said Police Magistrate to remand the plaintiff to prison for 2 whole days and 2 whole nights and to refuse to allow the plaintiff to be released on bail to any amount whatsoever.

6. On the 5th day of April now last past the plaintiff was again brought in custody before the said Police Magistrate and was at the termination of the day's proceedings released on bail in two sureties in \$25,000 each.

7. The proceedings before the said Police Magistrate were continued on the 7th, 13th, 15th and 16th April now last past on which latter date the said Police Magistrate committed the plaintiff for trial, and at the institution and request of the defendants fixed the amount of bail in the enormous sum of one hundred thousand dollars.

8. The plaintiff was utterly unable to find bail in such an amount, and in default of bail was committed to and detained in Victoria Gaol to await his trial, and the plaintiff was there imprisoned until the 4th day of June now last past.

9. Copies of the informations and depositions taken by and before the said Police Magistrate on the said 2nd, 5th, 7th, 13th, 15th and 16th April were forwarded in due course to the Acting Attorney General of Hongkong, and the said Acting Attorney General, who performs in this Colony functions analogous to those of the Grand Jury elsewhere, upon reading the said information and depositions, was disinclined to sign a bill in information against the plaintiff, or to proceed as Attorney General in any way against the plaintiff upon the said information, depositions or charges.

10. The defendants thereupon falsely and maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause presented to the said Acting Attorney General an information whereby they charged the plaintiff with, amongst

other things, having unlawfully and maliciously and with intent to defraud, set fire to a certain dwelling house at Victoria, being the said dwelling house No. 34 Bonham Strand West, certain persons named being therein at the time, and that the defendants falsely and maliciously represented to the said Acting Attorney General that they had other and stronger evidence to bring forward in support of the said charge than that appearing in the said informations and depositions and they exerted themselves to induce the said Acting Attorney General to sign and file the said information or indictment.

11. The defendants further falsely and maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause prosecuted and caused, and procured the plaintiff to be tried upon the said false charges before the Supreme Court of Hongkong in Criminal Session.

12. Upon such trial the plaintiff was unanimously acquitted of the said charges. The said prosecution was thereby determined.

13. By reason of the premises the plaintiff was seriously injured in his credit and reputation and the said dwelling house, being in his native country, was seriously affected in health by his long detention in prison and has suffered grievously in body and mind. The plaintiff was further put to an expense of \$8,000 in defending himself upon the said proceedings and trial and the plaintiff claims \$60,000.

1. The defendants admit that the plaintiff is a Merchant and was carrying on business at No. 34 Bonham Strand West as a dealer in Ginseng and Drugs under the style of Man Yuen Tong, but deny that he was a tea dealer under the style of Pang Yu Tai.

2. The defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the Petition.

3. In answer to paragraph 3 of the said Petition the defendants admit that on or about the 24th day of March last past the business premises of the said Man Yuen Tong situated and being at No. 34 Bonham Strand West were destroyed by fire, but they deny that any goods or merchandise were stored therein.

4. In answer to paragraph 4 of the said Petition the defendants admit that on or about the 22nd day of April last they appeared before Ernest Woodhouse one of the Police Magistrates of this Colony and charged the plaintiff with being an accessory before the fact to the unlawful and malicious setting on fire of the said premises No. 34 Bonham Strand being a dwelling house and that upon such charge a warrant was issued by the said Magistrate and that the plaintiff was arrested and brought before the said Magistrate on the 22nd day of April aforesaid, but the defendants deny that they acted falsely and maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause and that the said charge was falsely and maliciously made and that they caused the plaintiff to be imprisoned for 43 hours or thereabouts and that he was brought before the said Magistrate on the 4th day of April now last past.

5. The defendants deny the allegations contained in the 5th paragraph of the said Petition.

6. The defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the said Petition in so far as it states that the proceedings were carried on before the said Magistrate and that the plaintiff was committed for trial, but deny that it was at the institution and request of the Defendants that bail was fixed in the sum of \$100,000 or any other sum.

7. In answer to paragraph 8 of the said Petition the defendants say that they do not know whether the allegation that the plaintiff was unable to find bail is true, but they admit that he was detained in Victoria Gaol till the 4th day of June now last past.

8. The defendants admit the allegations contained in the 9th paragraph of the said Petition in so far as it states that the informations and depositions taken by and before the said Magistrate on the said 2nd, 5th, 7th, 13th, 15th and 16th April were forwarded to the Acting Attorney General, and that the latter performs in this Colony functions analogous to those of the Grand Jury elsewhere, but they deny the other allegations contained in the said paragraph.

9. The defendants admit the 10th paragraph of the said Petition, and in further answer to the said Petition the defendants say that before appearing before the said Ernest Woodhouse the Police Magistrate and before charging the plaintiff as aforesaid they had reasonable and probable cause for believing and they did believe that the plaintiff had been an accessory before the fact to the unlawful and malicious setting on fire of the said business premises No. 34 Bonham Strand West, and the said defendants say they acted under such belief and not otherwise in respect of the said proceedings.

Dated the 16th November, 1887.
(Signed) E. J. ACKROYD,
Attorney for the Defendants.

The Attorney General called the attention of the Court, before the reading of the case, to the last paragraph of the answer with reference to the course of procedure which might be followed in the trial. The paragraph contained a pleading positively alleging that they had reasonable and probable cause for proceeding as they had proceeded. He presumed that before they could plead that they could be required to set out in detail the facts that they intended to bring out as establishing reasonable and probable cause, so that the plaintiff should be in a position to call rebutting evidence. He therefore made the application now that if the defendants should bring forward any evidence the plaintiff should have an opportunity of calling rebutting evidence.

Mr Ackroyd contended that the defendants had nothing whatever to prove and that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff. They simply intended to bring forward such facts as would show that they at the time had a reasonable cause to prosecute the plaintiff. It was applied for and I strongly objected. My objection was that I thought the man would bolt like the generally do. The Magistrate asked me whether I had good grounds for opposing bail and I said I had the strongest possible grounds. I was not asked to disclose my grounds. I was therefore refused. I appeared again on Tuesday and bail was fixed at two sureties for \$25,000 each. Bail was opposed all through. When the Magistrate asked for trial the sum was \$100,000. That was the usual large sum, but the crime was an unusually serious one.

The Attorney General—I thought you were a crime of frequent occurrence. Mr Deacon—It is common enough in this colony, but we can't catch the perpetrators.

His Lordship—Well, that is a matter of opinion. Have you known any other cases? Mr Deacon—No, my Lord, but it is the common talk. (Examination proceeding.) Before I took the information to the Acting Attorney General for signature the

place on 24th March 1887, breaking out in the upper part of the premises about nine o'clock in the evening. The books of the gin-seng and drug business were saved, and the defendants were not allowed to remove them. There were two boxes, containing other books in the premises, which had been stolen from the premises on the night of the fire, which were now in Court. On the morning after the first plaintiff went to Messrs Putsau and made up a claim which he sent in. He was asked if there was any further claim to be made, and as to the answer he gave to that question there would probably be some conflicting evidence; but whatever his answer was he stated that the books relating to his business could not be got, and he was therefore not in a position to make a full statement of his claim. Subsequently he was without any explanation arrested and taken to the Police Station. He was afterwards tried before the Magistrate and committed for trial in the Supreme Court, where he was acquitted. The ground of this action was that the defendants had committed the crime of setting on fire the premises of the plaintiff, and that there was a want of reasonable and probable cause and that there was malice, two elements which made the wrongful in this case actionable. There was no desire on the part of the plaintiff to curtail his claim, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause, the jury might infer from that fact alone that there was the malice necessary to support his claim. The confession of the defendants, I think, subject to his Lordship's correction, that the law said a person acted maliciously in a case of this kind who acted from any direct motive, not a pure disinterested desire to see justice done, but that there had been some undue desire beyond a pure desire to see justice done, as the point of reasonable and probable cause was not in dispute, and the defendants had no ground for the action which they took in this case. If the plaintiff succeeded in proving a want of reasonable and probable cause

Kobe
Macao

Bar, at the China Mail Office, No. 2
Wyndham Street, Hongkong.